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The Health Care Reform – Not By These 
People, Not In This Way 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
In February 2007 a public discussion took place 
in the parliament on the topic of ‘Strategic 
Directions in Health Care’. In the discussion 
participated the Minister of Health, the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Health 
Care, the Vice-Chairman of the Health Care 
Committee of the Bulgarian parliament, 
representatives of the professional organizations 
in health care, the syndicates, the governing 
body of the National Health Insurance Fund, and 
others. What became apparent from the speeches 
given by the participants? 
1) Privatization of pre-hospital care is 
planned. 
This should have happened a long time ago, and 
that is why it is necessary to be realized in 
practice as soon as possible.  
2) Hospitals concessions are planned. 
This also is a good idea, but presented with the 
phrase ‘the effect will be negative…and it will 
lead to increase in public expenditure’ it is a 
little confusing. In principle, concessions are a 
way of generating resources for those who 
provide a concession, i. e. the government, and 
they lead to decrease in expenditure. Of course, 
if the goal is to provide concessions without the 
use of auctions or competitions, as was the case 
with the ‘Trakia’ highway, the results would be 
lamentable – but let us hope that such an 
approach will not be utilized again. 
3) Breaking of the monopoly of the state 
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) is not 
planned. 
Not one of those who spoke at the event, besides 
the author of this article, expressed support for 
the establishment of private insurance funds, 
which would compete with the NHIF. This 
means that we will have to wait for a while 
before any competition appears, leading to 
improvement in the quality of service and 
providing a choice to all citizens who pay their 
health insurance fees and to all those who rely 
on using the system. To illustrate this apparent 
absurdity, imagine that there is a single bank in 
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the country and that the value of the deposited 
savings into this bank is less than the value of 
the loans that it granted – what interest rates 
would this bank offer, what kinds of products 
would it offer, and would it have any incentive 
to do anything at all in order to attract or retain 
customers? And, at the same time, the people in 
power to be claiming that a bank is a very 
important and complex ‘thing’ and the private 
sector would not manage with such an activity, 
and the state must allocate more funds to cover 
the difference between the total value of the 
deposits and that of the loans.     
4) ‘The NHIF is not bankrupt’, but still ‘there 
is the need for more funds from the budget’. 
To the claim that the National Health Insurance 
Fund is about to bankrupt for years now, the 
Minister of Health replied that the NHIF is still 
working, which means that it is certainly not 
bankrupt yet. The question, however, is how and 
from where it is obtaining funds. In our opinion, 
if the revenues from health insurance payments 
are not enough to cover the expenses of the 
NHIF, it is de facto bankrupt. The chronic 
deficit, which is covered by the budget at the 
end of the year, means that the system is 
ineffective. 
5) There is an idea to unite the professional 
organizations of medical specialists and 
workers into a Bulgarian Medical Chamber. 
This, of course, should have been expected, 
because only the ones in Bulgaria that still have 
not thought of creating a nationally 
representative professional organization, have 
not done so yet. And if at the moment there is a 
Bulgarian Pharmaceutical Union, a Bulgarian 
Doctors’ Union, a Union of Bulgarian Dentists, 
a Bulgarian Association of Health Care 
Professionals, and each of those has come up 
with such rules for regulating their respective 
professions, that it is almost getting too difficult 
for non-member practitioners to breathe, then 
probably a common Chamber will make medical 
professions the most regulated in Bulgaria. And 
the chance to reach agreement within such a 
Chamber on any issue will be a major challenge. 
6) The introduction of a system for cutting 
down expenditures in the area of health care 
is planned. 
Unreservedly, this is perhaps one of the most 
sensible ideas, which have recently appeared in 
the public domain pertaining to health care. But, 
similar to other systems, such as those of the 
NHIF or the tax authorities, it most likely will 
not be realized within the next ten years. 
In summary, we should state that some of the 
participants clearly announced their opposition 
to most of the sensible reforms that were 
proposed and requested more money. Others 
explained that the reforms are to proceed but 
more money will nonetheless be needed. But 
who is going to provide this money? And should 
we continue to pour water into a leakey bucket, 
before patching up the holes on its bottom?  
 
 
Of course, the private enforcement of law 
works 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
Last week, certain facts became apparent, which 
the IME predicted more than two years ago, 
namely that the private enforcement agents will 
be working more effectively and will be 
preferred over their colleagues in public service. 
All of this happened in a rather surprising, to 
many observers, fashion – for a while now, the 
state also has preferred to have its receivables 
collected by private enforcement agents. This is, 
at first sight, even paradoxical, keeping in mind 
that along with the private enforcement agents 
are still working their colleagues in public 
service, and it is most logical that the latter 
group should be performing these functions at 
least when their work seeks to look after the 
interests of the public institutions.    
At the beginning of 2005, the IME developed an 
argumented assessment regarding the potential 
benefits and expenses of the planned system of 
the sole public enforcement of law. The results 
with regard to the incumbent situation were clear 
– the number of outstanding receivables grew 
each year, more and more creditors were 
inclined to turn to legally unsettled or illegal 
methods for collection of their receivables, and 
the system as a whole was completely 
ineffective.   
The prognoses regarding the effects of the 
creation of the institution of private enforcement 
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of law and its work were very optimistic. In 
other words, the passing of the Law on Private 
Enforcement Agents was justified, as the 
anticipated benefits far outweighed the expenses 
associated with the reform1. Fortunately, the law 
was passed and it became effective on 
September 1, 2005, while the first private 
enforcement agents began working in April 
2006. 
During this period, a number of people (mostly 
government officials) expressed doubts 
regarding the future quality of the work, the 
correctness, etc. of the private enforcement 
agents. But less than a year later, it is already 
apparent that their claims were completely 
groundless (which has been the IME’s stance all 
along). With this in mind, it is perhaps time to 
think about finishing what has been left 
unfinished (some reform has taken place, but it 
has been, as it is in most cases, incomplete and 
uncertain).  
It can happen with the realization of the 
following proposals, which we support and 
which were dismissed as too radical:  
• Complete abolition of the public 
enforcement of law  
This would result in savings from the budget 
funds, an inflow of funds from the larger number 
of private enforcement agents, additional 
employment in the private sector (incl. subpoena 
deliverers, filing clerks, and others), etc. On the 
other hand, as practice shows, the number of 
collected receivables will increase; enforcement 
agents will no longer have to work in primitive 
conditions, etc. 
• Providing of national competence to 
each private enforcement agent 2 
The institution of private enforcement of law is 
created in order to boost the collecting of 
receivables nationally and to result in increased 
effectiveness in enforcement. The faster 
satisfaction of creditors may be achieved, as the 
practice in other countries shows, when the 
market for enforcement services is functioning 
on the basis of competition. Inevitably, this 
means that each private enforcement agent 
                                                 
1 The full text of this analysis can be accessed at the 
following address: http://ria-studies.net/wp-
content/uploads/File/Cost_and_Benefit-last.pdf  (in 
Bulgarian) 
2 At the moment, the private enforcement agent can 
exercise their work only within the district of the 
respective county court 
should be allowed to collect receivables 
nationally. In this sense, competition provides 
not only an incentive for the faster offering of a 
particular service (as the one provided by the 
enforcement agent), but also serves as a natural 
distributor of work. The restricted national 
competence is a major disadvantage. Indeed, the 
existing legislation provides for the possibility 
of hiring aides, which would perform the 
functions of the private enforcement agent, and 
this could help the overcoming of some 
temporary climaxes. However, as a whole, the 
current regulations restrict competition 
nationally and lead to the formation of regional 
monopolies.  
• Abolition of the State’s Receivables 
Collection Agency (SRCA) 
Just several days ago, the SRCA entrusted 
private enforcement agents to collect debts owed 
to the State Fund Agriculture. This raises the 
question of why were the services of public 
enforcement agents not used (perhaps, because 
private enforcement agents work faster), and 
why is a state agency, trying to collect the 
receivables of other administrative divisions, 
needed at all – when those divisions could 
perform the function themselves. 
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European Market or European Union 
Market Regulation?3 
Dr. Remigijus Šimašius* 
 
To begin with, I should point out that the topic I 
am going to discuss today is a very broad one. It 
is both covering competition among states and 
ideologies, and among companies. It also 
examines how regulation is reflected in the 
economic activity and tax competition vs. tax 
harmonization issues in different states. We are 
going to pay attention to several subjects today. I 
will start with providing some theoretical 
background on the EU and its competition 
ideology. Afterthat I will give an example from 
a real sector of economy where competition is 
working – the telecommunication sector. We 
will continue with estimating the impact of EU 
competition regulation on the competition in the 
community. Finally, we will try to explore the 
liberalization vs. harmonization debate and to 
assess which is better.  
I will start with exposing some conflicting 
visions of the EU. This is especially important 
for Bulgaria since the country in one-step in the 
EU. There are two visions about the EU that are 
most popular: the European Union as a common 
economic area against it as a political union. The 
first vision is supported by the free-marketers. It 
leads to liberalization and open markets inside 
and outside the EU. More people believe that the 
EU is a political union. This vision leads to 
regulation, centralized harmonization 
(unification), and geopolitical competition. It 
makes the competition between the EU and third 
countries (USA, Canada, etc.) easier but do not 
assist the competition inside the EU - among 
countries and companies within the union. When 
talking about competition we should define the 
different competition ideologies.  
Competition is considered free, perfect or 
effective. Free competition is the possibility to 
enter market freely. Free competition is quite 
realistic and practical concept. It works in the 
real world showing which plans are wrong, and 
respectively how to improve or avoid them. Just 
on the opposite, the perfect competition is an 
                                                 
3 The presentation was prepared for the Conference 
on capitalism and happiness in the EU, organized by 
IME on 25th of November, 2006 in Sofia 
imaginary construction only. It is based on the 
equilibrium model and does not exist in the real 
world. The perfect competition idea is based on 
the thought that if one company does something 
in the economic area, this particular thing does 
not affect other actors in the same area. This 
logic is quite defective since each action in the 
economy makes an impact no matter how small 
this impact can be. This hypothesis is not even a 
good theoretical tool in discussing the real 
world.  
The third and most recently developed 
perspective about competition is called effective 
competition. It is closely related to the EU. 
Effective competition is actual competition. It 
allows “practical” choice. Effective competition 
is free competition regulated to become perfect 
(or at least improved) competition.  
Since perfect competition is unattainable, 
effective competition becomes quite complicated 
concept. For instance, if someone is offering a 
particular service and any other company is free 
to start offering the same service but do not offer 
it then we have theoretical competition but not 
effective one. If we look theoretical to effective 
competition, each competition in the EU 
especially sectoral competition is based on the 
idea that we have to introduce effective 
competition.  
Here is the place to elaborate on the natural 
monopolies argument as well, since they are 
connected to some extent to what we are 
discussing. People say that natural monopolies 
“ought to emerge” when marginal costs are 
lower than marginal benefits. However, what we 
see in practice is that in most of the cases we 
have marginal costs lower than marginal 
benefits. In this stream of thought we should 
underline that the natural monopoly is a non-
existing phenomenon. The so-called natural 
monopolies are either an outcome of regulation 
(because regulation has created them) or choice 
of consumers (because consumers choose to go 
to one supermarket instead of other and by doing 
so create dominant position, which in itself is a 
market outcome). In most cases, though this is a 
theory created by dominant companies in order 
to create territorial privileges, which is 
completely related to regulation but not to the 
market process and the market outcome.  
It is also important to know more about the 
“traditional” competition regulation. The three 
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main pillars of official competition regulation 
are: 
• Prohibition to abuse dominant 
position; 
• Prohibition of cartels; 
• Regulation of mergers. 
Now we have huge discussions in academia 
about competition regulation, whether it should 
be ex ante or ex post. The traditional 
competition laws specify that we have to 
regulate after the problems emerge. The 
competing vision is to deal with them and take 
precautions before the problem is already a fact. 
It seems that ex ante regulation is a more 
attractive position, since the problems will be 
handled in advance.  
The traditional competition regulation only 
describes basic principles and decides ex post on 
case-by-case basis. New trends in the EU 
consider this approach as slow, insufficient and 
not suitable for rapidly changing markets. 
Moreover, people say that there is a tendency for 
the companies to develop into natural 
monopolies, if there is no regulation ex ante. Ex 
ante regulation is being admired by regulators. 
But isn’t this approach a market modeling 
instead of market protection? This will cause 
some interference in market decisions. In ex ante 
regulation there is some vision of the market and 
desire to implement this vision.  
For instance the vertical integration in any 
sphere. Someone has the vision that the 
providers of the network should be separated 
from the providers of the service. Thus, they 
model the market so that to impede vertical 
integration. The market modeling is just the 
opposite of competition since it prohibits market 
process and impedes the choice between bad and 
good through the market.  
On the other side isn’t it natural to end with 
market modeling if you start with traditional 
competition law? If the competition is regulated 
ex post then there will be ending the market as 
such. The debate on ex ante – ex post regulation 
will be clarified by taking a specific example 
with the telecommunication industry, since it is a 
frontier industry, and it has been developing 
rapidly in the last couple of years.  
The telecommunication is a very specific 
industry with respectively specific regulations. It 
shows some main trends. The most important 
feature of the telecommunication industry is that 
it is a symbol of the failure of the natural 
monopolies doctrine. Recent surveys show that 
people consider the telecommunications as an 
intensely competitive market.  
The telecommunication sector is very dynamic. 
New technologies, new companies, and new 
demands are emerging every day. The specifics 
of the industry lead to formation of big players 
that are by definition dominant actors and have 
significant market power, and it is quite 
unrealistic to expect small players in the 
telecommunication market. As we have already 
mentioned the regulations in the 
telecommunication sector are quite specific.  
In the European commission, we have special 
directorate for telecommunication and in each 
member state, there are special agencies 
occupying themselves with telecommunication 
industry issues only. The regulations in the 
telecommunication industry aim to introduce 
effective competition. Regulators inescapably 
find most players as having “significant market 
power” or holding dominant position. Thus, 
regulation is becoming more “flexible” in order 
to catch up with the rapidly developing market 
conditions.  
If we think about the regulators who favor 
effective competition, we will see that they are 
the same people who were defending natural 
monopolies 5 or 10 years ago. This is not a 
complete change of direction though. These 
people still favor the same ideology because 
effective competition is compatible with natural 
monopolies argument but not with competition. 
The same regulators, who ensured monopoly 
rights, now regulate to implement effective 
competition. The visible outcomes of regulation 
are quite attractive and commission tries to sell 
these visible outcomes. There are many 
providers in the telecommunication sector, 
which is a sure sign for practical choice. The 
prices (of broadband, roaming, etc.) are lower in 
the short run because of the regulation. In 
addition, consumers have more rights, i.e. to 
leave the provider and to save the number.  
There are some invisible outcomes as well. 
There are disincentives to invest for example. If 
the prices of the broadband are regulated, 
nobody has the incentive to invest since he is not 
going to receive the profit he expects from this 
investment. Losses will be incurred by the 
investor, but profits will be expropriated. In the 
long run this invisible outcome increase prices. 
Another thing is the establishment of a 
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regulatory jungle. Companies in Lithuania are 
punished for not bargaining with customers 
while prices are regulated!  
Not the market but the regulation is a jungle and 
it is quite complicated to understand this jungle. 
Another invisible outcome is the technological 
non-neutrality. And of course we have natural 
orientation to the signals of the regulator, not the 
consumers, and a slow adaptation to new 
conditions. All of these is an example of the 
deepening of the goal to achieve effective 
competition not free competition. If this bad 
trend is not changed, we will end with this in all 
sectors.  
Now, let us return to the broader issues of 
competition and regulation and the participation 
of the government in these processes. 
Government affects competition through 5 basic 
channels: 
• Regulation; 
• Taxation - especially when there is no 
flat taxation; 
• Public ownership and discrimination of 
private ownership; 
• Public procurement; 
• Intergovernmental harmonization, and 
here we must quote the French president saying, 
“Companies, not governments have to compete”. 
Of course, it sounds very nice at first glance, but 
after profound investigation of the question we 
are able to see that this is the main trend 
defended by regulators who want to limit 
competition just to the companies and leave 
governments regulate, i.e. the taxation issues.  
If one looks at the governments, the EU and the 
private companies and which actor is allowed 
what in private competition it is quite clear that 
EU allows distortions of competition in every 
sector (standards, zoning, etc.). If someone 
wants to introduce some new standards, which 
will be beneficial to him, but not to his 
competitor s/he can just go to the EU 
commission or his regional municipality and 
propose the new standard. Competition can be 
distorted by government (not by private actors), 
and the involvement is always legal when done 
by the public actor. Only some state support is 
prohibited, but overall EU aggregates rather than 
diminishes state support. EU does not allow 
private agreements on the same issues where 
public (government) agreements are allowed.  
For instance, if companies want to agree on 
some standards, this will be called cartel 
agreement and respectively prohibited by the EU 
law. For the same outcome to be achieved these 
companies should go to the government and then 
the outcome will be legal. Thus, what appears is 
when two companies want to agree and not force 
the same agreement on others this will be 
considered illegal, and on the other side when 
the government forces this standard on 
everybody it is legal.  
States as such are monopolies and the EU as 
such is a cartel of states. Another thing is that 
EU funding directly distort competition. In 
Lithuania, for example some big factories 
received funding from the EU, which would 
never have happened before. When we take the 
government against the private companies, we 
will see a rather negative picture of the 
government.  
If we capture a specific example with Lithuania 
we will see that the only difference is that now 
the country has joined the cartel. Lithuania is the 
only state in EU that prohibits anticompetitive 
actions of governments: government and 
municipalities (but not parliament) are not 
allowed to take any decision that may hamper 
competition. Competition Council may issue 
compulsory rulings concerning these decisions. 
This was quite used before joining the EU, but 
what we have in practice now is ignoring of 
these provisions. The EU Competition DG does 
not force national Competition Council to 
implement it. The implementation of other 
provisions is treated as an essential even though 
the Treaty and the Regulation do not require it.  
Moreover, non-competitive public purchase 
from public companies (municipality has the 
same provider of garbage collection and now has 
an offer from private company) had been treated 
as illegal, but now it is legal because of EU 
practices. Overall, competition ideology and the 
theory the EU is using is fake, and as such, it is 
not working effectively.  
So should we have harmonization or 
liberalization in the European Union? To start 
answering this question we should emphasize 
that harmonization and liberalization are two 
different concepts and we cannot use them 
interchangeably. Harmonization means 
unification.  
There are numerous regulations and every 
behavior has a specific course of exercising it. 
Liberalization on the other hand is freedom and 
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acknowledgement of the right to be different. 
EU is more interested in the first concept than in 
the second. It is obvious in sectors such as 
telecommunication, services, taxation. The 
services directive gives plenty of regulations.  
Despite the concrete statement in the Treaty of 
Rome, that freedom of services is essential, the 
services directive leaves no freedom and no 
liberal market. It just aims to harmonize. In case 
of taxation, on the other hand, it is interesting 
how the same people introduce competition 
ideology and simultaneously favor the 
harmonization.  
For instance, Balkenstein who is known as the 
father of the services directive and for his 
liberalizing efforts also strives to introduce tax 
harmonization. And what Commission is trying 
to achieve now is summarized in two basic 
efforts: 1) to harmonize taxes and 2) to 
implement global access to information. Both of 
these aspects do not help business and 
competition.  
Harmonization of the tax base will lead to limit 
of competition among countries regarding 
taxation, and the global access to information 
will lead to sharing of information about taxes in 
different countries, which looks innocent but in 
fact will lead to drastic reduction of tax 
competition. And speaking about harmonization, 
the initiative for harmonization in the corporate 
tax-base is undertaken with the sole aim to 
achieve harmonization of tariffs.  
One other aspect of the debate harmonization vs. 
liberalization is that liberalization can actually 
lead to decentralized harmonization. A good 
example for this will be the spillover effect of 
the flat tax. Flat tax disease in Europe started 
from Baltic States. It happened partially because 
it was initiative by government that was not 
opposed, and partially because of the 
hyperinflation. The mergers and the progressive 
taxation became quite important after some 
years of hyperinflation.  
People liked the flat taxation and some other 
countries looking at the experience of the Baltic 
states understood it is quite reasonable to have 
flat tax. They began copying the example or in 
other words started practical harmonization. 
Therefore, if we open the markets and introduce 
liberalization it will be followed by 
harmonization, which is to say to change your 
own practices according to the best practices in 
the EU, not to force others to change according 
to officially accepted practices, which might not 
be the best ones.  
Thus, harmonization is a very good trend and 
our efforts are against forced or centralized 
harmonization (unification), not against 
harmonization per se, since when you have 
possibility to choose and harmonize according to 
your own choice this is a positive trend, which 
we do not oppose. And my proposals here are 
first related to competition in general and only 
afterwards as a result to taxation. In my view, 
we should abolish ex ante competition 
regulation. We should also abolish sector 
specific competition regulation and limit 
regulation in general since it always distorts 
competition. Private agreements, which are now 
illegal because of cartel, dominant position and 
merger regulation, should be allowed as well. 
And competition between both companies and 
governments should be liberated.  
Broadly, my conclusion is that we have to 
choose European market, not European 
Union Market Regulation! 
* Executive Director of Lithuanian Free Market 
Institute 
Speech given at IME Conference on "Economics, 
Capitalism and Happiness in the EU", November 
25th, 2006 
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IME Recommends: 
 
This new book is a guide to how economic growth, technological change, and free trade combining to 
power a “cycle of progress” have led to unprecedented improvements in human well-being. 
 
‘The Improving State of the World: Why We're Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a 
Cleaner Planet’ 
 
by Indur M. Goklany, the Cato Institute 
 
For details, including reviews, excerpts, or order information, see the following link: 
http://www.catostore.org/index.asp?fa=ProductDetails&method=&pid=1441339  
 
Announcement: 
 
Starting in the next issue of the EPR, the world’s leading academic institutions for the study of economics 
and their impact on the subject will be reviewed in a segment entitled ‘The Premier Institutions for the 
Study of Economics’. The first school to be reviewed will be the London School of Economics and 
Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
